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PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER
SINCE THE EVENTS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

Mr. President of Golden Gate University,
The Dean of the School of Law,
Distinguished Fulbright Scholars in Residence,
Honorable members of the American Society of International Law
and of the American Society of Comparative Law,
Fellow Members of GGU Faculty,
Consoeurs et Confreres :

It is twelve years ago that Golden Gate University initiated its first Annual Fulbright
Symposium on international legal developments. Today we are celebrating the close of the first
cycle of the Annual Fulbright Symposia.
Simultaneously Golden Gate University School of Law is hosting the initiation of the
second decade of international law. It is the Eleventh Regional Meeting of the American Society
of International Law.
It is this time of year that international scholars and practitioners of international law in
diverse fields are gathered at Golden Gate from the region of the Bay Area and beyond to pursue
a meaningful exchange of views among themselves and with learned counterparts from outside
the United States, notably a selected body of Fulbright Scholars in Residence and comparatists
from within and without the region.
Last year Golden Gate launched its second decade entitled "THE DAWNING OF A
NEW ERA FOR THE EVOLVING RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW."

This year a

succession of events have taken place which deserve the closest attention of observers of the rule
of international law and order in the making.
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The events of 11 September 2001, which sent shock waves to the conscience of mankind
the world over, have entailed other consequences unattended by perpetrators of the terrorist acts
against the United States and little suspected by the international community at the time. To
every action, there is a reaction. The wheel of international justice moves slowly but surely as
it requires necessary accompaniments, especially the overwhelming support of the global
community and the underlying rule of international law on the subject.

I. THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 set the stage for an accelerated pace in the
progressive concretization of rules of international law on the topic of State Responsibility with
particular regard to its application to the breach of the primary rule of international law
governing international liability.
Under pre-existing international law, a State is liable, irrespective of fault or proof of
wrongfulness, for its failure to prevent the occurrence of harm or infliction on another State or
States of injurious consequences arising out of activities initiated or conducted in the territory
within its jurisdiction or control. 11 While States and international and regional organizations
promptly responded to the apparent urgent universal call for the cessation, suspension and
immediate termination or discontinuance of such nefarious activities, the forces of destruction
continue vigorously to threaten and to terrorize the global community. International terrorists
persisted in their relentless efforts to inflict untold pain, sorrow and sufferings, accompanying
the menacing reign of terror, striking innumerable indiscriminate fatal blows at countless
members of the international community, regardless of their creed, religion, belief, gender, age,
nationality or political ideology and affiliation.
General principles of the law of State Responsibility appear intimately involved in

I]

The duty of care is place squarely on the State, from whose territory harmful activities
emanated, transgressing national boundaries, or activities otherwise within its jurisdiction
or control. Liability is therefore based on the territoriality principle or the principle of
jurisdiction or control of the State which is held to be strictly if not indeed absolutely
liable for the injurious harms.
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connection with circumstances precluding wrongfulness, such as counter-measures21 and selfdefense. 31 It is of primary interest to ascertain the legal consequences of an internationally
wrongful act, in particular the rights of the injured State41 and the obligations of the State which
has committed the internationally wrongful act, 51 as well as the rights and obligations of third
States. 61 Theories based on the practice of States and of competent international and regional
organizations deserve an examination in the light of the on-going crisis that continues to threaten
the peace and security of mankind.
In addition to a critical analysis of the relevant part of the law of State Responsibility,
attention will also be directed to two other areas of international legal development in
contemporary international law and practice. The first concerns the primary rule of law on the
international liability of a State for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by
international law. The second relates to the concerted international actions and measures in
pursuit of individual offenders perpetrating organized crimes under the law of nations, the grave
crime of international terrorism, targeting primarily on one State in particular, symbolizing the
free world but ultimately directed against the international community as a whole, being a
serious crime under international law designated as an offence against the peace and security of
mankind. The crime of 11 international terrorism II, as such, should be revisited in the context of

2]

In Draft Articles on State Responsibility, adopted at second reading by the Drafting
Committee of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. AICN .4/SR.2662, appendix
to the Report of eh ILC, New York 2000, GA Doc. Supplement No.lO (A/55/10) at pp.
110 et seq. Part II, Chapter II : Counter-measures, especially Articles 50-55, as well as
Article 23 : Counter-measures in regard to an internationally wrongful act.

3]

See Ibid., Draft Article 22 : Self-Defence.

4]

See Ibid. , Draft Articles 43 and 44 : The right of the injured State or States to demand
compliance and the form of reparation.

5]

See Ibid. , Draft Article 28 : Legal consequences of an international wrongful act;
Article 29 : The continuing obligation of the State responsibility to perform the obligation
breached; Article 30 : Obligation to cease and desist and non-recurrence; and Article
31 : Obligation to make reparation.

6]

See Ibid. , Draft Articles 41 and 42 : Consequences of grave violations of obligations
owing to the international community as a whole (erga omnes).
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the events of 11 September 2001.

II. STRICT INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR STATES
GENERATING INTERNATIONAL INJURIES

Strict or absolute international liability of States may be traceable to Draft Article 27
(former Article 35) of State Responsibility, which states that the existence of circumstances
precluding wrongfulness in this Chapter (Chapter V Part I) is without prejudice : a) to the
respect for the obligation in question or its extent if the circumstance precluding wrongfulness
no longer exists; or b) to the question of compensation for the injuries or material losses suffered
as the result of that international wrongful act. 71

Therefore, even where wrongfulness is

precluded, a State may still be liable for the injurious consequence it has effectively caused or
allowed to occur, or indeed failed to prevent. On this general principle is based a primary rule
of law fastening strict or absolute liability on the State on whose territory or under whose
jurisdiction or control activities conducted thereon or thereunder have resulted in transnational
harms or inflicted injuries or material losses across and beyond the limits of its national
jurisdiction or territorial boundaries.
This primary duty on the part of the State to prevent the occurrence of harms across its
frontiers and beyond has initially developed from transboundary pollution or emission of
transfrontier air pollutants as in the case of Trail Smelter between the United States and Canada
in 1938 and 1941. 81 The origin of this primary obligation under contemporary international law
has its foundation in the Roman Law and Anglo-American common law, as evidenced by the
Latin maxim : sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which literally means "use your property in
such a way as not to harm others". This concept of liability is based on restrictive enjoyment
of one's own property, or limited and regulated use of proprietary rights subject to the need to
prevent harm to others.

It appears to be a primary obligation towards the international

7)

See Ibid. , Draft Article 27 (35) at pp. 116-117.

8)

3 Report of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA) 1905 (Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal
1938-1941).

5

community as a whole or an obligatio erga omnes, so that there is a primary duty on the part
of every State to undertake precautionary measures that are consistent with obligation to prevent
harm. 91
This was emphatically endorsed by Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 1972 in
these words :Principle 21 : States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the Principles of International Law, the sovereign rights ..... and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to . . . . . other States or . . . . . areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. "101

This principle has been identified with the primary rule of strict liability initially for
environmental damage to neighboring States.

In time, the rule has been extended to cover

injuries and losses suffered by persons beyond the immediately adjacent territories. Settlements
of bilateral disputes between States illustrate far reaching coverage of this rule of law as in the
Lake Lanoux Arbitration (1957) 111 and in the settlement of the Gut Dam Claims (1969). 121
In these cases, the rule that a State must refrain from harming its neighbors, received further
application with far wider implication. A State must also prevent harm in the territories of
adjacent States and beyond. It has given rise to the European Polluter Pays Principle as in the
pollution of the River Rhine 131 which runs across western Europe from Switzerland through

9]

See, e.g., Report of the ILC covering the work of its 44th Session, ss. 112-276, UN
Doc. A/47/10 (1992), reprinted (1992) 2 Yearbook of ILC, Part 2, at 1. 18-41, UN.
Doc. A/CN.41, Ser, A/1992/Add/1 (Part 2).

10]

Stockholm, 5-11 June 1972; UN Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972); reprinted in 11 ILM 1416
(1972).

11]

France v. Spain, 24 International Law Reports 101 (Arb.Trib. 1957).

12]

USA v. Canada, 8 ILM 118 (Lake Lanoux Claims Tribunal1969).

13]

Convention Relating to the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollutants (with
alUlexes), Dec. 3, 1976, UNTS I-17 511. Compare the Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and other Matters, Dec. 29, 1972, 11 ILM 1291
(1973). See also the Brussels Convention on Establishment of an International Fund for
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the Federal Republic of Germany to the Netherlands and Belgium. The losses and injuries were
suffered by the communities in the riparian States.
In the Corfu Channel Case (1949), 141 it should be observed that the International Court
of Justice held Albania liable for failure to warn international shipping of the existence of mines
within its waters, of which Albania ought to have known. In any event, the knowledge of their
existence was imputed to Albania with the consequential duty to warn the sea-faring nations of
the existence of the danger to enhance the safety in international navigation through the
international waterway, the Corfu Channel.
This rule of strict or absolute liability under international law is based on the analogy of
private law, common law as well as civil law. The law of land-owners' liabilities or liabilities
of occupiers of premises has its counterpart. The vicarious liability of an owner of a dangerous
animal, such as a tiger or a vicious dog, may entail the possibility of noxal surrender.
In the case under review, the fact that Afghanistan under the Taliban Government, not
only did not attempt to prevent the disaster from occurring but also failed to surrender the
alleged offenders who caused the injuries and losses to the United States and the international
community. In addition to these grave omissions, the Afghan Taliban authorities also attempted
to conceal the truth and refused to disclose the hide-outs or whereabouts of the AI Qaeda within
Afghan territories under Afghan jurisdiction and control. Without at this stage examining the
degree of guilt and complicity of the Taliban authorities for the international acts of terrorism
of 11 September 2001 and the continuing threats of terror, it is sufficiently if not abundantly
clear that the host State, Afghanistan, from where the attacks originated, must bear the
responsibility under the primary rule of international law : sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
The liability of Afghanistan is established beyond doubts.

The fate of the Taliban for the

destruction of the image of the standing Buddha appears inevitable under the Karmic Law : for
every evil deed there is a sanction, and for each good deed a reward is awaiting.

Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1981, 834 UNTS 17-46.
14

1

UK v. Albania, 1949, ICJ Report 4 (Merit april 9). Albania was held liable because

"nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to prevent the disaster. The grave
omissions involved the international responsibility of Albania. "

7

Ill. QUANTIFICATION OF COMPENSATION, SELF-DEFENSE,
PRE-EMPTIVE STATES AND COUNTER-MEASURE

Once liability of the State of Afghanistan is established for the injuries and losses suffered
by others, an assessment could be made of the quantum of the reparation required of it to wipe
out the consequences of the internationally wrongful act. 151 The irony of the matter is that any
conservative estimate of the amount of compensation under international law would be far
beyond the capacity of the successor government of Afghanistan, let alone the Afghan population
who stands in dire need of international rescue and assistance ..
Other legal discussions relate to the exercise of self-defense which is the inherent right
of every State, and the United States is not excluded. The danger of an unannounced suicidal
attack against the United States everywhere has in no way receded, hence the right of the United
States is recognized to exercise its legitimate self-defense. Care should be taken in the exercise
of the right of self-defense that all the elements of an armed attack must be present, the danger
of an attack being overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation. 161 Furthermore, measures of self-defense have to be proportional to the risk and
limited in scope as well as in time. Pre-emptive strikes have to be based on the need for selfdefense and similarly restricted in application.
Counter-measures, on the other hand have other limitations, and only legitimate countermeasures are permissible. A State contemplating counter-measures does so at its own risk, i.e.,
the risk of excessiveness, which will engage its own responsibility.

In any event, forcible

counter-measures or the use of force in the implementation of counter-measures must have been
approved by the international community, such as the Security Council, the principal organ of
the United Nations, primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and
security.

15)

See the Chorzow Factory Case, Germany v. Poland, PCIJ Ser. A., No 9, p. 31 (1927).

16)

See The Caroline, 2 Moore, International Law 409-414 (1906); Robert Jennings, The
Caroline and Macleod cases, 32 AJIL 82 (1983).
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IV. TREATMENT OF ALLEGED TERRORISTS

Much debate has taken place surrounding the treatment of the Taliban and AI Qaeda
detainees, who for reasons of collective safety based partly on the precautionary principle have
been isolated and kept under preventive detention at a United States base in Cuba at Quantanamo
Bay. Questions have been raised regarding the applicability of the Geneva Convention of 1949
and Protocols of 1977, especially in regard to the Taliban and the AI Qaeda detainees, their right
to counsel, right of appeal and right to a fair trial. This concern should not detract from the
tense situation and potentials of further repetition of terrorist suicidal acts, harmful to society
and fatal to the terrorists themselves.
Whatever types of proceedings selected by the United States for the trial and criminal
process, it should be recalled that, not unlike pirates ex jure gentium, even though enemies of
mankind (hostes generis humani), they are nonetheless human beings, entitled to be treated as
such, and protected by international humanitarian law including their entitlements to the rights
and dignity of man. The eyes of the world are watching the actions taken by the United States,
which is bound to conduct itself in an exemplary manner, having regard to the oft-cited
invocation of the international RULE OF LAW, for which the United States must not relinquish
its responsibility as champion.

V. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

It is customary for the Annual Meeting to discuss landmark decisions of the International
Court of Justice in the months preceding the occasion. This past year has seen two celebrated
cases worthy of the most careful attention, namely, the case concerning the execution of Walter
LaGrand (Federal Republic of Germany v. United States of America, ICJ. Report, 27 June 2001
and the Judgment of 14 February 2002 in The Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, ICJ
Report, 2002.

The LaGrand Case
To our incredulous but pleasant amazement, the Federal Republic of Germany, unlike
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Paraguay, did not relinquish its pursuits against the United States even after the execution of
Walter LaGrand in the face of provisional measures indicated by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ Report 1999, p. 9 para. 6) in the following terms :(a)

The United States of America should take all measures at its
disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the
final decision of these proceedings and should inform the Court of
all the measures which it has taken in implementation of this
order;

(b)

The Government of the United States of America should submit
this Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona.

On the same day as the above of 3 March 1999, proceedings were brought by Germany
in the United States Supreme Court against the United States and the Governor of Arizona,
seeking inter alia to enforce compliance with this Court's Order indicating provisional measures.
In the course of these proceedings, the United States Solicitor General, as counsel of record took
the position, inter alia, that "an order of the International Court of Justice indicating provisional
measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief." On the same date, the
Supreme Court dismissed the motion by Germany on the ground of the tardiness of Germany's
application and of jurisdictional barrier under United States domestic law. On the same day,
proceedings were also instituted in the United States Supreme Court by Walter LaGrand. These
proceedings were decided against him. Later that day, Walter LaGrand was executed.
The United States acknowledged and did not contest Germany's basic claim, that there
was a breach of its obligation under Article 36 (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, "promptly to inform the LeGrand brothers that they could ask that a German Consular
post be notified of their arrest and detention.
Germany argued in its second submission that under Article 36 (2) of the Vienna
Convention, the United States was under an obligation to ensure that its municipal "laws and
regulations enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended: and that it "is in breach of this obligation by upholding rules of domestic
law which make it impossible successfully to raise a violation of the right to consular notification
in proceedings subsequent to a conviction of a defendant by a jury. " The Court found for
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The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incument
Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes
they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom
it applies from all criminal responsibility.

Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under

international law by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar
to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances. The Court refers to circumstances where such
persons are tried in their own countries, where the State which they represent or have
represented decides to waive that immunity, where such persons no longer enjoy all the
immunities accorded by international law in other States after ceasing to hold the office of
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and where such persons are subject to criminal proceedings before
certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court finds that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the
arrest warrant of 11 April 2000. and its international circulation, constituted violatins of a legal
obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in that
they failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the
incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo enjoyed under
international law.
The Court also finds that the Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its own choosing,
cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and so inform the authorities to whom that warrant
was circulated.
Thus, the wheel of international justice continues to progress at its own speed as surely
as the earth rotates around the sun.

Sompong Sucharitkul
28 March 2002

